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The Politics of Fear: How Russia’s Rulers Counter Their Rivals


Around midnight on 27 February 2015, Boris Nemtsov, one of the leaders of the Russian political opposition, was shot dead near the Kremlin. His assassination occurred just two days before an opposition rally intended to launch a series of protests against the regime and generate a new wave of mobilization similar to the 2011-2012 post-election protests. Nemtsov’s murder, however, changed the opposition’s entire agenda; numerous meetings and rallies in Moscow and other cities were devoted to mourning him, and did not become a new “point of departure” for anti-Kremlin activism. Irrespective of the motives behind this crime and of those who stand behind it, Russia’s rulers actually benefited from Nemtsov’s murder. From a broader perspective, Nemtsov’s assassination was a logical consequence of the major turn towards repression made by the Kremlin after Vladimir Putin’s return to the presidency in 2012. This turn served as the Kremlin’s response to the sudden rise of political protests during the 2011-2012 elections: it was intended to prevent them from spreading further. It demonstrated a change in the mechanisms of political control used by the Kremlin vis-à-vis its rivals. In the 2000s, Russian authorities had opted for buying loyalty of citizens and cooptation and isolation of the dissenting political and social actors who raised their voices against the regime and/or its policies. Now, these methods have been replaced by the politics of fear, which include overt intimidation and public discrediting of the regime’s critics, and selective persecution and open harassment of opposition activists and/or supporters. However, the turn towards repression was only partly a reaction by the Kremlin to the wave of protests; to a major degree, it was caused by the exhaustion of the previous regime’s strategy of political control, which was primarily based on buying the loyalty of the elite and society at large, and on media manipulation. This rationale of political control to some degree reproduced similar mechanisms that had enabled regime survival in the late-Soviet period, but at the same time it fit general trends of repressive policies in a number of contemporary authoritarian regimes.
It is too early to judge to what extent and for how long Russia’s rulers will be able to keep their political monopoly through the use and abuse of the politics of fear. The goal of this article is different: it attempts to analyze the causes and mechanisms of the politics of fear in contemporary Russia, to trace their roots in comparative and historical contexts, and to understand the strengths and weaknesses of repressive policy in Russia from the viewpoints of the regime, the opposition, and Russian society. Some implications are presented in the conclusion.

To Beat or Not to Beat: Authoritarianism and Strategies of Repressive Policy

Although the world’s political history to is a large degree a history of dictatorships, which often employed bloody repressions towards the people of their respective countries, modern autocrats do not always rely upon mass repressions as a major mechanism of maintaining their rule, for a number of reasons. First, the major sources of threats to an authoritarian regime relate to intra-elite conflicts rather than mass protests.​[2]​ From this viewpoint, the extensive use of repressions and the strengthening of the coercive apparatus of the state is a risky game for leaders and for members of their “winning coalitions”, whose chances of becoming victims of repressions themselves are higher than those of ordinary citizens. Second, in modern urbanized and educated societies with a relatively high level of socio-economic development, state-induced mass political violence in general, and mass repressions in particular, are rarely considered legitimate mechanisms of holding political power.​[3]​ Third, repressive authoritarian regimes which do not conduct elections may also face problems of international legitimation.​[4]​ This is why many contemporary autocracies, which have to avoid risks of disequilibrium and retain political control for their survival, are forced to apply other tools and leverages. They tend to modify a number of democratic institutions, such as elections, legislatures, and political parties, to suit their needs,​[5]​ prefer cooptation over coercion vis-à-vis political challengers, and employ more sophisticated propaganda techniques.​[6]​
With the recent wave of gradual replacement of “classical” (or “hegemonic”) authoritarian regimes with electoral authoritarian regimes (which use formally competitive but unfree and unfair elections),​[7]​ the scope and extent of use of coercion and repression in these regimes has tended to decline. The gloomiest phenomena of mass repressions, such as the Gulag or the genocide by the Khmer Rouge, have become matters of the past, while contemporary autocracies use less bloody means to retain their power. This turn does not mean that authoritarian regimes refrain from coercion towards domestic rivals; the stick remains a major tool in their arsenal alongside carrots for buying loyalty and cooptation. But the strategy of coercion has undergone a major change from mass to selective repressions. In other words, the targets of repression are no longer citizens at large and/or certain social groups such as ethnic or religious minorities, but rather, certain individuals and/or organizations which actually raise their voices against the regime or are capable of doing so at the first opportunity. Selective repressions are often open and demonstrative (politically driven arrests and incarceration, exile, forced emigrations, torture, disappearances of people, and political assassinations) but can be used implicitly (surveillance both of persons and of private correspondence, the use of provocateurs, public discrediting and isolation, etc.).​[8]​ The strategy of selective repressions is not primarily intended to punish the regime’s enemies (although this motivation is often present) but to prevent the spread of oppositional activism beyond the relatively narrow circle of the regime’s devoted opponents. From this perspective, selective repressions perform the political function of signaling: they demonstrate to the elite and ordinary citizens that open manifestations of their disloyalty may result in heavy losses. This fine-tuned approach to repressive policy can be more efficient for the preservation of authoritarian regimes than mass repressions, but it also requires keeping a delicate balance between sticks and carrots, and skillful and measured application of various tools of political control.
Why are some modern authoritarian regimes forced to use repressions more frequently and extensively than others? As Adam Przeworski rightly observed, “authoritarian equilibrium rests on lies, fear, or economic prosperity”.​[9]​ The weakening of one of these three political pillars prompts autocrats to shift their center of gravity to the two others. In their recent theoretical article, Sergei Guriev and Daniel Treisman argued that the degree of repression in modern authoritarian regimes is highly negatively correlated with economic growth rate.​[10]​ When economic growth is rapid and sustainable, autocrats prefer to rely upon cooptation of their real or potential challengers, and buying the loyalty of their fellow citizens; there may be room for contentious politics on certain issues, but there is no room for open discontent with leaders and regimes as such. However, if the growth rate experiences a major decline and the economy enters into stagnation or recession, then autocrats have to replace carrots with sticks and rely upon the weapons of large-scale propaganda (lies) alongside selective repressions (fear). Hence, the turn towards repression and the politics of fear are considered to a large degree as projections of certain structural conditions and constraints of authoritarian regimes.​[11]​
Meanwhile, the choice of a strategy of repression is driven not only by structural conditions but also by autocrats’ perceptions. Christian Davenport, in his analysis of the reactions of both democratic and non-democratic regimes to threats of political disorder, argued that perceptions of these threats are dependent not only upon the overall level of protests and discontent but also upon their unexpectedness. Moreover, threats are perceived more seriously if and when they arise from multiple sources, are accompanied by diverse strategies from the regime’s rivals, and include a broad variety of forms of protest (especially if these involve both peaceful and violent means). As the rulers come to expect dangerous threats to the regime more and more, they become increasingly likely to give an affirmative response to the existential question of whether “to beat or not to beat” their rivals. According to Davenport, the most important factor which affects the choice of strategies of repression in authoritarian regimes is their previous experience of repressive policy. If repressions in the past served as efficient tools for diminishing threats to the regime’s survival, then the chances of their use in the future increase, as do their scope and intensity.​[12]​ Thus, repressive policy may turn into a vicious circle: small-scale repressions encourage further application of these tools, and once they rely on repressions, authoritarian regimes tend to use them over and over again, even if the risk of the regime being subverted is actually not very high.​[13]​
This array of factors and features allows us to reconstruct the logic of the shift towards repression in Russia after 2012. In the 2000s, the Russian political regime demonstrated low repressiveness for two major reasons. First, impressive economic growth contributed not only to the rise in well-being for many Russians but also to a major increase in their loyalty toward the Kremlin.​[14]​ Second, because the Russian state wielded significant financial resources, the Kremlin was able to diminish certain manifestations of public discontent (the case of protests against the monetization of social benefits in 2005 was a typical instance of this approach) and coopt some segments of the Russian establishment. Thus, the scope of mass political and social protests in Russia in this period remained relatively low, and they were not perceived as a major threat to the regime’s survival.​[15]​ Repressions at that time were localized and targeted – the Kremlin harassed a small number of immediate participants in noisy protest actions (“marches of dissenters”, “Strategy 31”, and the like) and several other individuals. At the same time, dissenting representatives of Russia’s establishment were not persecuted but rather discredited and isolated; independent media, NGOs and activists were pushed into narrow niches (if not ghettos) and had no chance to deal major damage to the regime.
However, the situation changed during the presidency of Dmitry Medvedev, when, after the economic crisis of 2008-2009, resources for rapid economic growth in Russia were exhausted, and the pillar of economic prosperity of regime’s equilibrium has been shaken: Kremlin’s strategy of buying loyalty of Russians doesn’t work anymore​[16]​. In these circumstances, the Kremlin’s actions were rather inconsistent: it reduced the pressure on its rivals and gave certain signals of possible liberalization, only to demonstratively curtail both in the run-up to the 2011 State Duma elections. These developments triggered a sudden wave of mass protests which the Kremlin did not expect. Although the scope of protest mobilization was not enough to form a major challenge to the regime’s survival, its demonstrative effects were very visible and frightening for Russia’s rulers.​[17]​ No wonder that the “tightening of the screws” which was announced by Putin immediately after the 2012 presidential elections was to some extent a reaction by the Kremlin to new threats and challenges. Apart from these reasons, this response was a logical consequence of economic trends. The Kremlin faced a shortage of the financial resources necessary for buying the loyalty of its fellow citizens the way it had done in the 2000s – the attempt to increase salaries in the public sector proclaimed by Putin in his series of May 2012 decrees was wholly unsuccessful and resulted in numerous problems for regional budgets. Thus, the politics of fear, as well as more aggressive and extensive state propaganda, became major instruments of maintaining authoritarian equilibrium. 
The events of 2014 – the overthrow of Yanukovych’s regime in Ukraine after a series of large-scale protests, the annexation of Crimea, proxy war in Donbass, Russia’s conflict with the West, and the beginning of a new recession in the economy – contributed to further intensification of repressive policy. It became more systematically conducted and institutionally arranged, the number of its targets greatly increased, and new actors were involved in its implementation – not only state officials and Kremlin-sponsored GONGOs but also a number of activists, who initiated certain attacks upon rivals of the regime and disloyal individuals. In essence, the degree of repressiveness of Russia’s regime after 2012 skyrocketed in comparison with the first two terms of Putin’s presidency, though it remained relatively low on the global scale of dictatorships. In the lead-up to the coming cycle of federal elections in 2016-2018 and against a background of escalating economic problems in Russia, one might expect that the scope and intensity of repressions in Russia will increase further.​[18]​
Such a brief overview is still not sufficient for an analysis of goals, mechanisms, efficiency, and consequences of repressive policy in Russia. Answering these questions requires a reassessment of the experience of the repressive policies which have served both as role models and as sources for imitation for Russia’s present rulers.

“Success Stories”: Repressive Policy in the Late Soviet Union and in Post-Soviet Belarus

In the context of present-day Russia, repressive policy in the late Soviet Union is worth further consideration for several reasons. First, the dream of the “good Soviet Union” (a political order similar to the Soviet one, but free of the inherent inefficiency of the Soviet economy and of Communist ideology) may be regarded as a kind of normative ideal for the current generation of Russian rulers. This image emerged in the minds of a certain part of the generation which had grown up and was socialized during the period of the “long 1970s” (1968-1985), and continues to be reinforced over time as this generation reaches late middle age.​[19]​ The image of the “good Soviet Union” includes, inter alia, a hold on the mechanisms of state control, which maintain authoritarian equilibrium. All three pillars of the Soviet authoritarian model – lies, fear, and economic growth – for a while performed successfully in resolving these issues, but their efficiency declined over time, and by the end of the Soviet period they collapsed nearly simultaneously. The ineffective lies of official Communist propaganda, as well as the declining trends of the Soviet economy during the “long 1970s”, forced the Soviet regime to employ the politics of fear as its primary tool. Nevertheless, the late-Soviet state was able to cope with the rising discontent of its citizens, at least in the short term, without the use of mass repressions and without provoking open resistance. The late-Soviet leaders provided major incentives for those politicized Soviet citizens who were disaffected by the Communist regime to prefer “exit” strategies in various forms (ranging from alcoholism and downshifting to emigration) over “voice” ones, while the apolitical silent majority of the population retained loyalty to the regime, thus not challenging the political status quo.​[20]​
When, after Stalin’s death, Khrushchev’s Thaw was in full swing, the Soviet regime no longer used mass repressions. However, it faced not only the emergence of a dissident movement, but also numerous instances of mass riots which spontaneously occurred in different parts of the country for a variety of reasons.​[21]​ The extensive use of force for their coercion (the most well-known case, the Novocherkassk massacre of 1962, being just the tip of the iceberg) was a risky game for the Soviet political leadership.​[22]​ That is why the Soviet repressive policy underwent certain adjustments and transformed into a model which the Belarusian scholar Vitali Silitski labeled “preemptive authoritarianism”.​[23]​ This model is based on reliance upon “preventive work” (profilakticheskaya rabota) aimed to avoid the spread of protest intentions among various social groups. The Soviet coercive apparatus established an efficient mechanism of political control which included monitoring and intimidating disloyal citizens. Meanwhile, the arsenal of the coercive apparatus included not only the stick of threats of repressions and/or career difficulties, but also the carrot of cooptation, which could lead to promises of career advancement, material benefits and other rewards for loyalty to the regime.
On the individual level, the risk of being punished for open anti-regime activism was perceived by late-Soviet citizens as high, so it was no wonder that even those people who were critical toward the regime preferred to avoid conflict with the authorities. Despite the high demand for alternative information about the state of affairs in Soviet Union and beyond (the large audience of foreign radio stations that broadcast to the USSR is clear evidence of that),​[24]​ most late-Soviet citizens limited their disloyalty to “kitchen talks”. At the same time, the Soviet regime used a wide range of “active measures” (aktivnye meropriyatiya) to punish its loudest and most dangerous rivals, ranging from expulsion from jobs and de facto bans on professional activity to the political abuse of psychiatry and forced emigration. 
Even though the number of political prisoners in the late-Soviet period was relatively low, selective repression and other coercive techniques were pervasive. Thus, Soviet citizens received clear signals that being involved in organized dissent would lead to trouble. Under these conditions, the narrow collective of devoted dissidents found it hard to broaden their ranks, despite a large number of potential sympathizers and rising disillusionment in the regime, both among the Soviet establishment and within society at large. Even though positive incentives for loyalty to the Communist regime declined over time against a background of economic stagnation and poor prospects for upward mobility, these tendencies in themselves did not lead to a rise in mass protest activism due to the inertia of the politics of fear, which were backed by the memory of the previous Soviet experience of mass repressions.
The consequences of late-Soviet repressive policy were devastating for rivals of the Communist regime. The protest movement during the “long 1970s” was relatively small in numbers, organizationally weak, and nearly exhausted by the beginning of Gorbachev’s reforms.​[25]​ It had neither the resources nor the capabilities to offer well-designed and relevant alternatives to the existing politico-economic order; later on, during the period of perestroika, this shortage of ideas was felt in full.​[26]​ Latent dissatisfaction with the Soviet system was expressed in forms other than organized protests, but it did not deliver major challenges to the Communist regime until the country underwent leadership changes and a new wave of reforms was launched. The rise of the social and political movements of the perestroika period was driven from the top, and their connection with the dissidents of the “long 1970s” was rather loose. Even though certain symbols of resistance such as Andrei Sakharov and Sergei Kovalev were very visible in the new landscape of pro-democratic movement, they played secondary roles at best.​[27]​ To put it bluntly, the late-Soviet repressive policy enabled the Communist regime to postpone the risk of the spread of mass discontent, and provided a whole generation of Soviet leaders with a relatively comfortable hold on power, simply transferring the rising problems onto the shoulders of their successors.
While the “good Soviet Union” is largely perceived in the eyes of Russia’s current rulers as a kind of normative ideal, it is the experience of post-Soviet Belarus which in many ways could serve as their practical role model in terms of repressive policy. The “iron fist” approach used by Alexander Lukashenko allows him to diminish risks of disloyalty among the elite and avoid the threat of mass discontent.​[28]​ Unlike in Russia, where the coercive apparatus of the state was fragmented and weakened after the Soviet collapse at the organizational and personal level,​[29]​ in Belarus it demonstrated a major continuity, and its resource endowment greatly increased under Lukashenko. After the crackdown on resistance among the elite in 1996, in the late 1990s the regime conducted a cleanup of the political landscape and reshaped and consolidated the elite around the ruler; while some visible Belarusian opposition figures disappeared without a trace, the large-scale abuse of power during the elections met little resistance from Belarusian society.​[30]​ The limited pool of civil activists came under attack by the state from several directions; foreign donors and initiatives aiming to promote of democracy and civil society were pushed out of the country, the harsh control of the state over businesses prevented their financial support of the opposition, very restrictive legislation on NGOs forced them into closure and/or self-limitation of activism, and the independent European Humanities University, with its liberal and nationalist agenda, was exiled and involuntarily moved from Minsk to Vilnius. The regime used a wide array of tools against its rivals, ranging from prohibition of anonymous access to the Web to threats of being fired for political disloyalty; the recently announced criminal prosecution of “social parasitism” in Belarus serves as a logical extension of these tactics. This repressive policy has borne great fruit for the regime: unlike several other post-Soviet states, which have been encountering threats of major post-election protests, Belarus remains an island of authoritarian stability.​[31]​ While in the 2000s protests were weak and insignificant, after the presidential elections in December 2010 they gave rise to a major crackdown: provocateurs took the lead in an opposition rally, stormed the main government building and fought with the police. This episode became a pretext for a wave of mass arrests and imprisonments, and contributed to even greater systematic discrediting of the opposition.​[32]​
Despite economic growth of the 2000s, Lukashenko’s regime was able to provide only few positive incentives for loyalty for Belarusian citizens, but this shortage was partly compensated for by strong incentives to “exit” in the form of emigration. Not only dissenters, but also ambitious professionals who felt dissatisfied with conditions and opportunities in their own country often opted for a life and career in Russia or elsewhere in Europe, thus reducing the regime’s rivals’ chances of undermining the domestic political status quo. As a result, the Belarusian opposition (a noisy conglomerate but one limited in size) experienced multiple schisms and internal conflicts, and over time lost the capabilities needed to become a serious political actor. The lack of viable alternatives strengthened Lukashenko's position, and he was able to preserve his power over twenty years without major challenges. Although Russia’s rulers may not be too happy with the perception of their country as a “big Belarus”, in fact the experience of Russia’s closest neighbor turned out to be of great lesson to the Kremlin, especially after the wave of 2011-2012 protests.​[33]​ Not only did particular measures of repressive policy imitate the Belarusian experience (for example, the clash of protesters with police in Bolotnaya Square in Moscow in May 2012 was almost a carbon copy of the above-mentioned Minsk provocation in December 2010) but the Kremlin also employed strategies which strongly resembled those of Belarus. Harsh public discrediting of the regime’s rivals, harassment and selective repressions of leaders and activists, intimidation of their potential allies and coercing independent-minded persons into silence or emigration became widespread practices of the Russian regime, while before 2012 these repressive techniques were used relatively rarely. One is forced to admit that the turn towards repression has resulted in a certain degree of success for the Kremlin.

Fear and Loathing in Russia: A Vicious Circle of Repression?

The repressive turn in Russia was launched on 6 May 2012. That day, a protest rally in Moscow culminated in violent clashes between participants and the police at Bolotnaya Square, thus signaling that the Russian state's repressive policy had intensified in several dimensions.​[34]​ The immediate effect of these clashes was a series of arrests and the subsequent imprisonment of dozens of protesters. Most of them were not professional activists; rather, there were a number of random victims. In the spirit of the politics of fear, the Kremlin demonstrated to supporters of the opposition that their undesired political activism could get them in serious trouble.
Soon after that, the scope and scale of protest actions in Moscow was greatly reduced (although the trend towards decline had been observed even earlier), and some activists fled the country, fearing prosecution. More importantly, accusations of attacks against the police and organization of mass riots were used as a pretext for legitimation of the “tightening of the screws”. Further adoption of repressive legislation aimed to establish harsh punishment for violations of restrictive laws and to broaden the already wide-ranging powers of law enforcement agencies. It also extended the scope of actual and/or expected sanctions for transgressing formal and informal “rules of the game”, as well as opportunities for selective and arbitrary application of these sanctions against an indefinitely large pool of individuals and organizations.​[35]​ Both the institutional changes and the political moves of the Kremlin in 2012-2013 were oriented towards preventing the further spread of unwanted information, draining the funding of opposition activities, and imposing very tight constraints on any independent activism, both political and social. Among these moves, the most important were the following:
	Amendments to the law “On non-commercial organizations”, and other legal acts, which became known as “the law on foreign agents”. These acts demanded that NGOs which received foreign funding be registered as “performing the function of foreign agents” were they to conduct “political activities”. The intentional vagueness of the legal norms left ample opportunity for arbitrarily stigmatizing virtually any organized form of civic and social activism. At the same time, the status of “foreign agents” meant not only the public discrediting of NGOs which received this label, but also very complicated requirements for their legal and financial reporting, imposing high costs on these organizations. After the adoption of this law, pro-Kremlin media orchestrated a vicious campaign against “disloyal” NGOs. They had also been attacked much earlier, after the wave of “color revolutions” of 2003-2005, but at that time NGOs had been portrayed as pro-Western marginals who begged for foreign funding near embassies. After 2012, they were perceived as a serious threat and a major tool for possible overthrow of Russia’s regime​[36]​ (in this respect, Russian autocrats were very much in line with their counterparts in various parts of the globe, who also attacked NGOs in their respective countries with similar accusations);​[37]​
	New regulations on the Internet, which gave state agencies the authority to block websites and social media for a wide array of legal violations without any court decision. For example, in March 2014 a number of websites which criticized the annexation of Crimea, such as Grani and Ezhednevnyi zhurnal, were blocked for an indefinite period. Although the most advanced users can find ways to circumvent these blocks, their audiences were largely wiped out;​[38]​
	Amendments to the Criminal Code, which  restored criminal liability for defamation in the media (its decriminalization, adopted under Medvedev’s presidency, was short-lived); although no media outlets have been punished as of yet, there are strong incentives for self-censorship among journalists and editors;
	Changes to rules on money transfers via banks and electronic payment systems: under the pretext of combating terrorism, new regulations have severely restricted the amount and frequency of anonymous donations, as well as the amount for individual donations – tricks that were aimed at undermining the financial bases of the opposition;
	Tightening of sanctions for violations of regulations on meetings, rallies, and other public gatherings (including criminal liability);
	Extension of anti-extremist laws adopted in the 2000s: new amendments increased sanctions for their violation, broadened powers and widened discretion of law enforcement agencies, and also criminalized “separatist claims” and “insult of religious feelings of believers”. Needless to say, the legal grounds for application of these rules were intentionally formulated very vaguely, while the regime-induced hysteria of “culture wars” was effectively employed by the Kremlin as a tool for consolidation of various social groups around the regime.​[39]​
The combination of harsh regulations and their selective enforcement is the essence of the systematic and consistent politics of fear in Russia, which targets more and more individuals and groups. If the regime previously perceived journalists, bloggers and civil activists as its main rivals, after 2012 this pool was greatly extended. For example, the active campaign against “foreign agents” ruined some socially oriented NGOs which were loyal to the authorities. In Krasnodar Krai, Mikhail Savva, professor of Kuban State University and director of grant programs at a resource center for NGOs which actively collaborated with the regional government, was accused of embezzlement of state funds, spent several months in jail, and finally fled Russia.​[40]​ The story of Sergei Guriev, former rector of the New Economic School, is even more telling: due to the high risk of criminal prosecution induced by the Kremlin in response to his public activism, Guriev refused to return to Russia from his trip abroad, and resigned from his post.​[41]​ The Kremlin not only does not prevent, but even partly assists the emigration of its rivals, rightly considering this to be a means of neutralization of possible threats. Meanwhile, the number of political prisoners in Russia remains rather low in comparison to many authoritarian regimes: the most comprehensive list, compiled by Memorial in June 2015, cites no more than fifty names.​[42]​ The authorities have even refrained from incarcerating the most renowned opposition leader, Alexei Navalny.
Despite the tremendous efforts invested by the Kremlin in the politics of fear, by early 2014 their effects remained partial and inconsistent. The turn towards repression may have suppressed some symptoms of the challenges to Russia’s rulers which manifested during the protests of 2011-2012, but it was not able to eliminate their causes. The rise in demand for political changes, and the growing problems maintaining the status quo in domestic politics, has translated into unexpected results for subnational elections – Kremlin-backed candidates have lost to popular local leaders in a number of cities (including Yekaterinburg and Novosibirsk). The Moscow mayoral elections in September 2013, where more than 600,000 city voters supported Navalny, demonstrated the failure of the politics of fear.​[43]​
In this respect, the Kremlin’s turn to aggressive foreign policy after the annexation of Crimea and the rising conflict with the West over Ukraine has also become an asymmetric response to challenges in domestic politics. The regime’s popularity was boosted by militarist national-patriotic mobilization aimed at consolidating Russian society around a new agenda of confrontation (the “rally around the flag” effect),​[44]​ while the regime’s rivals were condemned as the “fifth column” of “national traitors”, who served as puppets of the Western enemies to help them destroy Russia. It is hard to say to what extent the Kremlin really considers regime change in Ukraine to be an effect of the subversive activities of the West and its Ukrainian allies, but the consequences of overthrow of Viktor Yanukovych appear frightening for the Kremlin: one can easily imagine Putin one day sharing the fate of his Ukrainian counterpart, albeit in somewhat different circumstances. In the context of Russian domestic agenda, this fact has become the turning point in a Kremlin-induced propagandist campaign (the scale and intensity of which are without precedent since Stalin’s times) and legitimizes the further toughening of repressive policy in Russia.
The new wave of public discrediting of the Kremlin’s rivals has been accompanied by harsh new regulations and their more systematic (though still arbitrary) implementation. The push for further sanctions and aggravated repressions against potential challengers was a blow to NGOs. In 2014, a new series of legal amendments empowered law enforcement agencies to label NGOs “foreign agents” without court hearings. The number of “foreign agents” greatly increased, and many of them were forced to stop their activities or cease to exist as legal entities. The case of the Dynasty Foundation, a major private sponsor of science-related research and education programs, exemplifies this policy. Its donor, Dmitry Zimin, endorsed certain projects related to the opposition, and his foundation was labeled a “foreign agent” and ultimately closed. Furthermore, the new law on “undesired” foreign NGOs imposed criminal punishment on Russian individuals and organizations for collaboration with the foreign NGOs included in the blacklist; soon after its adoption, several international donor organizations, such as the MacArthur Foundation (which supported a large number of academic projects), ceased their activities in Russia.​[45]​
The Kremlin also exerted more intense and systematic personal pressure against opposition leaders and activists, and other public figures. Navalny, who had previously received a suspended sentence after a manufactured criminal case against him, was placed under house arrest. His brother was jailed for 3.5 years after yet another manufactured criminal accusation. Vladimir Ashurkov, close ally of Navalny and major organizer of his fundraising campaign, was accused of embezzlement of funds and forced to seek political asylum in Britain. Apart from discrediting in the media and pressure through the coercive apparatus of the state, the regime’s rivals faced open political violence. Lev Shlosberg, a Yabloko member of the Pskov regional legislative assembly who disclosed information on Russian military causalities in Donbass, was heavily beaten by persons unknown;​[46]​ later on, Putin released a special decree classifying information of this kind.




As the forthcoming elections to the State Duma (rescheduled for September 2016) and the presidential elections of 2018 draw near, one might expect that the Kremlin will further prioritize repressive policy, that its scope and intensity will increase, and that new targets and areas will be hit by the politics of fear. This tendency depends not only upon the preferences of Russia’s rulers but also upon Russia’s increasing economic problems. The shortage of financial resources needed for cooptation of potentially disloyal social groups may contribute to new repressions: lacking enough carrots, the Kremlin may be tempted to rely primarily upon sticks.​[48]​ Thus, one might expect that the politics of fear will expand and most likely reach new levels despite seemingly high public support of Vladimir Putin, which was demonstrated by numerous mass surveys.​[49]​
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